Bureaucrats or Politicians? Political Parties and Antidumping in the US by Aquilante, Tommaso
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Bureaucrats or Politicians? Political
Parties and Antidumping in the US
Tommaso Aquilante
Birmingham Business School
November 2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70359/
MPRA Paper No. 70359, posted 1 April 2016 17:07 UTC
Bureaucrats or Politicians?
Political Parties and Antidumping in the US*
Tommaso Aquilante†
Abstract
Antidumping (AD) is the most widely used contingent protection measure. In the United
States, key decisions on AD are delegated to the International Trade Commission (ITC),
an independent agency composed of six non-elected commissioners. Using a newly col-
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period. Contrary to the view that ITC commissioners are bureaucrats who simply follow
technical rules, I find that their decisions crucially depend on which party has appointed
them (the selection effect) and on the trade policy interests of key senators in that party
(the pressure effect): whether (Democratic) Republican-appointed commissioners vote in
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1. Introduction
Policies can be decided by elected politicians and appointed, non-elected, bureau-
crats. In many countries, key decisions are taken by appointed officials. Examples are
the Supreme Court and the Federal Reserve Bank in the US or the European Central
Bank in the EU. One reason that is often mentioned to motivate the delegation of policy-
making to non-elected people is that, their decisions can be isolated from political pres-
sure. Economists have mostly focused on the independence of central bankers (Rogoff,
1985; Waller, 1989, 1992; Persson and Tabellini, 2002). However, motivations for delega-
tion also apply to other important policies and institutions.
A notable case is the US International Trade Commission (ITC), a quasi-judicial agency
headed by six non-elected commissioners delegated by Congress to administer, in a fair
and objective manner, a large part of the US antidumping (AD) proceedings. Essentially,
ITC commissioners administer one of the most important non-tariff barrier allowed by
the WTO/GATT rules to protect domestic industries from unfair business practices of
foreign firms.1 In particular, a foreign firm is considered to be dumping if it sells a prod-
uct abroad at lower price than the one charged in its domestic market, or at a price that is
below an estimate of cost plus a normal return. To counter this behavior, domestic firms
can ask their governments to be protected by AD measures. To impose such measures,
the importing country must prove that dumping has occurred and has caused material
injury to domestic producers.
AD has increasingly been used by governments.2 Conceived as a tool to restore the
“level-playing field", vested interests can turn it into a protectionist device, widening
the risk of trade-chilling effects (Vandenbussche and Zanardi, 2010).3 To deflect pressure
from lobby groups, politicians have delegated AD to independent agencies (see Ander-
son and Zanardi, 2009). As mentioned above, this is the case in the US, where the verifi-
cation of material injury has been delegated to the ITC.4 Baldwin (1985), Destler (1986),
1With the remarkable decrease in the level of import tariffs, AD has become one of the most used trade
barriers (Blonigen and Prusa, 2003; Bown, 2013; Blonigen and Prusa, 2015).
2The number of countries with an AD law has almost tripled since 1980. In a world where tariffs have
decreased dramatically, AD measures might be used as a substitute to grant import-protection (Vanden-
bussche and Zanardi, 2008).
3Several papers (e.g. Durling and Prusa, 2006; Bown and Crowley, 2007; Besedeš and Prusa, 2013) have
shown that AD has sizable restrictive effects on trade. In the case of the US, for instance, these effects have
been estimated to be equivalent to a 6 percent tariff applied to all firms (Ruhl, 2014).
4The existence of dumping is instead investigated by the US Department of Commerce. Section 2 de-
scribes in detail the AD proceedings in the US.
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and Anderson (1993) argue that, in line with its mandate, the ITC follows technical rules
when deciding on AD. This is also the view of former ITC commissioner Deanna Okun:
“...No, it’s not a political role. That’s one of the interesting things about the ITC, in
terms of independent agencies."5
This paper asks whether ITC commissioners are independent “bureaucrats” who sim-
ply follow technical rules when voting on AD, or whether their decisions are affected by
political parties. There are two main channels through which parties can shape ITC de-
cisions. First, when new commissioners are appointed, they must be approved by the
Senate.6 By law, no more than three of the six commissioners can be appointed by the
same political party. Effectively, this means that the ITC is composed of three Democratic
and three Republican commissioners implying that parties can influence the selection of
ITC officials. Second, once appointed, they regularly interact with the Senate, in par-
ticular with the Finance committee (e.g. when the ITC is heard on key trade matters).
This paper shows that ITC commissioners’ decisions crucially depend on which party
appointed them and on the trade policy interests of key senators in that party.
To carry out the analysis, I have constructed a new dataset containing all ITC com-
missioners’ final votes on material injury during the 1980-2010 period and I combined
it with information on commissioners’ characteristics (e.g. party affiliation, gender, age,
employment background). For each AD vote, I also constructed measures of trade policy
interests of leading Democratic and Republican senators, based on data on industry-level
employment for the states they represent.
I first examined whether the voting behavior of ITC commissioners depends on the
party that appointed them: Democratic-appointed commissioners are systematically more
protectionist than Republican-appointed ones. The effect is sizable: the increase in the
predicted probability of voting in favor of AD associated to a Democratic-appointed com-
missioner ranges from 8 to 39 percentage points. This is in line with studies showing that,
during the last decades, Democratic congressmen have been systematically more pro-
tectionist than their Republican counterparts (Baldwin and Magee, 2000; Hiscox, 2002;
Conconi et al., 2014). The results thus show that the voting behavior of Democratic and
Republican-appointed commissioners reflects the trade policy preferences of the party
that appointed them, against the presumption that they are bureaucrats who only follow
5Extract from “The ITC explained: WIPR talks to Deanna Tanner Okun”, The WIPR (October 1, 2010).
Deanna Okun has been ITC commissioner from January 2000 to September 2012.
6See Section 2.2 for a more detailed description of the appointment process.
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technical rules. This suggests that political parties can play an important role on AD by
appointing ITC commissioners with similar trade views. I will refer to this finding as the
selection effect of political parties.
I then study whether commissioners’ votes on AD depend on the trade policy in-
terests of the party that appointed them. In particular, I focus on senators who belong
to the Trade sub-committee, the subset of the powerful Finance committee which deals
with trade matters. I find that whether (Republican) Democratic-appointed ITC com-
missioners vote in favor of AD at a given time depends crucially on whether this is an
important industry in the states represented by (Republican) Democratic members of the
Trade sub-committee at the time of AD votes. This result suggests that leading members
of both parties might put pressure on ITC commissioners to vote in line with their own
trade policy interests. While other studies (e.g. Hansen, 1990; Moore, 1992; Hansen and
Prusa, 1997) have shown that politics can influence the ITC voting behavior, to the best
of my knowledge, this is the first one to show that this influence is party-specific. I will
refer to this result as the pressure effect of political parties.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the AD pro-
ceedings in the US and the link between Senate and ITC commissioners. Section 3 briefly
reviews the related literature. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 and 6 present the
results. Section 7 reports the robustness checks. Section 8 concludes.
2. AD in the US
As mentioned in the previous section, a country can only impose AD measures if it
can prove that foreign firms have been dumping and that this behavior has caused (or
threatened to cause) material injury to the domestic industry.
2.1. The AD Proceedings
In the US, dumping and material injury investigations are respectively the tasks of the
US Department of Commerce (Commerce hereafter) and the ITC. The process leading to
the imposition of an AD measure consists of five stages.
The first stage is the filing of an AD petition, that is a request of protection against
alleged dumped imports of a given product from a given country.
Petitions must be filed by interested parties (i.e. firms, trade or business associations
and unions of workers) on behalf of a US industry which is allegedly materially injured
(or threatened to) by reason of imports that are being, or are likely to be, sold in the US
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at less than fair value.7 Once a petition has been filed, Commerce has 20 days to decide
whether petitioners’ claims are sufficiently reasonable for the dumping investigation to
start. If this is the case, Commerce initiates the investigation; if not, all the proceedings
terminate.
The second stage involves the preliminary injury decision by the ITC. Once Commerce
decides that petitioners’ allegations are reasonably grounded, the ITC has 45 days to de-
termine whether there is convincing indication that an industry in the US is materially
injured (or is threatened with material injury) by imports of the product under investiga-
tion. The determination is affirmative if the number of commissioners who find material
injury is larger than (or equal to) the one of those who do not (evenly divided votes are
counted as affirmative ones). If the ITC vote on material injury is negative, proceedings
are ended.
The third stage and fourth stages are respectively the the preliminary dumping decision
and the final dumping decision of Commerce.8 The preliminary (final) decision must be
taken within 160 (235) days after the date on which the petition was filed. A negative
preliminary decision on dumping does not stop the investigation process, which goes on
until the final decision. If this is negative, the entire proceedings ends.
Finally, the fifth stage is the final material injury decision by the ITC. This has to be
taken within 280 days from the date when the petition was filed. If the vote is affirma-
tive, an AD measure is imposed.9 My empirical analysis focuses on these final ITC votes.
Notice that the stages before the final-injury one have historically proven to be highly
unselective: from 1980 onwards, more than 90% (80%) of the dumping (preliminary in-
jury) decisions have been affirmative (Bown, 2015). This is not the case for the final ITC
decisions, for which the same percentage is less than 65% (Bown, 2015).
7According to the WTO AD agreement (1994), a product is sold to a price that is below the fair value
if a foreign firm sells at home, the same product (or a similar one) at a higher price or it sells abroad the
product at a price which does not cover the cost of production plus a reasonable addition for the cost of
selling and profits.
8With the the preliminary dumping decision, the magnitude (margin) of the dumping margin is also com-
puted. If the dumping margin is very small (less than 2% of the export price of the product) the so called
de minimis rule applies and the investigation has to be terminated immediately.
9AD measures can take the form of a duty (i.e. a tax on imports of the product under investigation) or
of price undertaking (i.e. an agreement to increase the price of the product that was unfairly exported to
the US).
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2.2. The ITC and the Senate
The ITC has a central role in shaping the use of AD in the US. Established by Congress
in 1916 as an independent agency, it is composed of six commissioners who are appointed
for nine non-renewable years.10 By law, no more than three commissioners can be from
the same political party (19 U.S. Code § 1330). As a result, three of its members are usually
from the Democratic party and three from the Republican party, with terms scheduled
to end 18 months apart. When a new commissioner needs to be appointed, the Senate
plays an important role: once the President has put forward a nominee, the Senate has to
confirm (or not) the name through a two-stage procedure. A first vote takes place in the
Finance committee (by simple majority rule). If this approves the nominee, a second vote
takes place in the Senate at large (again by simple majority).11
Moreover, the interaction between the Senate (and in particular the Finance Trade
sub-committee) and the ITC commissioners goes beyond the approval of the presidential
nominees. In particular, under section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the ITC can be heard
on any matter involving tariffs or international trade, e.g. the Trade sub-committee may
ask the ITC general to produce fact-finding investigations (see also Moore, 1992).12
3. Related Literature
This paper relates to several streams of research. First, it contributes to the analysis of
the political economy of AD.13 The peculiar characteristics of US AD proceedings have
triggered a large literature studying the political economy motives behind the ITC voting
behavior. The evidence is mixed. Baldwin (1985), Destler (1986), and Anderson (1993),
for instance, find that the ITC voting behavior is not influenced by political pressure,
i.e. in voting on AD, the ITC follows the rules. In a seminal paper, Finger et al. (1982)
argue instead that, despite the requirements set by the US law, the injury decisions of the
ITC are subject to some discretion. Moore (1992) shows that AD petitions involving (the
powerful Finance Senate) Trade sub-committee members’ constituencies are more likely
to be favored by the ITC. Similarly, Hansen (1990) and Hansen and Prusa (1997) find that
10In reality, the tenure of ITC commissioners is often shorter and (in a few cases) longer than 9 years.
11Section 4.3 provides more details about the interplay between ITC commissioners and the Finance
Trade sub-committee.
12The Trade sub-committee also authorizes the ITC’s budget, which is however set in detail by other
committees (see DeVault, 2002).
13See Nelson (2006) and Blonigen and Prusa (2015) for a review of the literature on the political economy
of AD.
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the ITC, though keeping into account economic factors, it is also influenced by domestic
political forces when deciding on AD. My results also suggest that Congress can exert
influence on the ITC with one important novelty: political influence is party-specific, i.e.
ITC commissioners are more likely to protect the interests of the parties that appointed
them.14
Second, it contributes to the literature on bureaucrats and politicians. Some papers
have focused on why some policy tasks are more frequently delegated than others. Alesina
and Tabellini (2005) argue that politicians are more likely to forgo policy tasks that have
little redistributive impact. Focusing on the US, Anderson and Zanardi (2009) argue that
they could be willing to delegate in order to reduce the influence of lobbies in determin-
ing the electoral outcome. Other papers, like Alesina and Tabellini (2007, 2008) explicitly
compare the suitability of bureaucrats and politicians in performing (single or multiple)
policy tasks, concluding that bureaucrats should be preferred in technical ones (i.e. for
those in which ability is more important than effort). This paper provides evidence of
the responsiveness of bureaucrats to politicians’ interests, showing that delegation is not
enough to make the ITC immune from political influence: the voting behavior of its com-
missioners crucially depends on which party appointed them and on the trade policy
interests of key senators in that party. This result is closely related to the literature on
judges’ preferences and courts’ neutrality in the US (see for instance Nagel, 1961; Brace
et al., 2000; Iaryczower et al., 2013; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2014): judges’ characteristics
(e.g. political affiliation) crucially shape their voting on fundamental issues, questioning
the objectivity of the courts’ sentencing.
Third, it relates to the literature emphasising the role of career concerns in shaping
the performance of managers (e.g. Holmström, 1999; Brickley et al., 1999) or bureaucrats
(e.g Dewatripont et al., 1999a,b). The finding that commissioners votes on AD are in-
fluenced by political parties could be interpreted through the lens of career concerns:
career-motivated commissioners could please their party or in order increase the chances
of finding a good job once the their mandate expires.
Finally, the paper also relates to the extensive literature on the political economy of
trade policy. Several studies have focused on voting and elections (e.g. Mayer, 1984;
14A recent study by Avsar (2014) uses a panel of twenty countries to show that the increase in the leftist
orientation of governments is associated with an increase in the likelihood of an affirmative AD outcome
from the petitions of labor intensive industries. In this paper, I take into account the ideology of people
who actually vote on AD for the US (i.e. the ITC commissioners), showing that their voting behavior relates
to trade policy interests of the political parties they are linked to.
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Baldwin, 1985; Magee et al., 1989; Dutt and Mitra, 2002; Helpman and Grossman, 2005).
Much attention has also been devoted to the role of lobby groups (e.g. Grossman and
Helpman, 1994; Helpman, 1995; Goldberg and Maggi, 1999; Mitra, 1999; Gawande and
Bandyopadhyay, 2000). Other studies have focused on different political factors, such as
governments’ inability to commit to policy choices (Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, 1998),
ratification rules (Conconi et al., 2012), term length and election proximity (Conconi et al.,
2014). This study examines the influence of political parties on AD decisions.
4. Data
To perform the analysis, I collected all ITC commissioners’ final votes on material
injury during the 1980-2010 period. Over the time span covered in this paper, 1,230 AD
petitions were filed in the US. Of these, 798 reached the final-injury-decision stage.15 I
focus on the final-injury decisions because, of the two taken by the ITC, it is arguably the
most important. In fact, over the sample at hand, 86% of the preliminary injury decisions
were affirmative. The same percentage drops to 65% when computed for the final injury
decisions, suggesting that material injury standards are lower at the preliminary stage
than at the final decision (see also Prusa, 1991; Moore, 1992).
4.1. Votes on AD
Using the information made available in the ITC reports and in other ITC official doc-
uments, I collected 4,644 commissioner-level final injury votes.16 For each vote, ITC re-
ports also list the country/countries that allegedly caused material injury to the petition-
ing US industry. The number of commissioners who votes on AD is sometimes different
from six, e.g. when the Senate is late in approving the presidential nominee. Also, in
some cases, commissioners do not participate in an AD vote. This happens, for example,
if they are unable to follow the bulk of an investigation because they were recently ap-
pointed. Since non-participation is considered as a non-vote, I exclude these observations
15I concentrate on petitions initiated after the entry into force of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 that
reached the final-injury stage by the end of December 2010. Data before that date could in principle also be
collected. Nevertheless, the Act significantly changed some AD proceedings, making the combination of
pre-Act and post-Act cases inappropriate (see Baldwin and Steagall, 1994). In particular, the Act shortened
the AD investigations’ time limits and shifted the determinations of the less than fair value from the US
Treasury Department to Commerce. Importantly, it also required injury to be caused by reason of imports
being sold at less than the fair value in order for an AD measure to be imposed (Sklaroff, 1979).
16See the Appendix for a complete description of data sources.
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from the sample.17 I also dropped the 173 votes of the Independent commissioners (see
below) and the petitions for which the votes of the ITC commissioners were not disclosed
(e.g. for confidentiality reasons). Finally, is some cases (see below), it was not possible to
map the codes of the product under investigation into industry codes. The sample used
for the analysis is thus made of 3,983 commissioners’ final votes on material injury.
The dependent variable Voteikct, i.e. the vote of commissioner i, at time t (i.e. at the
time when the decision on AD was taken), on whether to grant AD to a product belonging
to industry k, imported from country c, equals 1 if the commissioner votes in favor of AD
and 0 otherwise. Table 1 collects summary statistics of the dependent variable: the mean
of Voteikct across all the commissioners is 0.639 indicating that in the majority of the cases
they voted in favor of AD.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations
Voteikct 0.639 0.480 0 1 3,983
Democrati 0.489 0.500 0 1 3,983
Republicani 0.511 0.500 0 1 3,983
Femalei 0.444 0.497 0 1 3,983
Ageit 52 9.94 33 71 3,983
Legislativei 0.369 0.482 0 1 3,983
Executivei 0.260 0.439 0 1 3,983
Academiai 0.123 0.329 0 1 3,983
Privatei 0.248 0.432 0 1 3,983
PressureDemtk 0.154 0.361 0 1 3,983
PressureReptk 0.198 0.399 0 1 3,983
4.2. Commissioners’ Characteristics
Combining information contained both in the biographies provided by the ITC as
well in the Marquis’ “Who’s Who” database, I constructed several variables that capture
important characteristics of commissioners.
First, commissioners are usually appointed by the President as Democratic or Repub-
lican.18
17The cases of non-participation were only 3.21% of the sample and were not concentrated in any partic-
ular industry and year or against a specific target-country.
18Out of 29 commissioners who were at the ITC during the time span of the sample, only 2 were Inde-
pendent.
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To verify whether party affiliation shapes their votes on AD, I constructed two dummy
variables: Democratici and Republicani equal 1 if commissioner i is appointed as Demo-
cratic or Republican and 0 otherwise.
Gender and age have been shown to be important drivers of individuals’ preferences
for trade policy (see for instance Mayda and Rodrik, 2005). To account for the role of
these demographic characteristics, I construct the variables Femalei, a dummy equal to
1 if the commissioner i is female, and Ageit, which captures the age of commissioner i
when he or she voted on material injury at time t. I have also collected data on com-
missioners’ employment background. Baldwin (1985) and DeVault (2002) argue that pre-
vious employment of commissioners might affect their preferences on trade. To explore
this relationship, following DeVault (2002), I construct the following (mutually exclusive)
dummies: Legislativei, Executivei, Academiai and Privatei. These are equal to 1 if the last
employment of commissioner i, before joining the ITC, was in a legislative or executive
body, in academia or in the private sector and 0 otherwise.
Table 2 lists all the ITC commissioners during the sample period and their key charac-
teristics. Table 1 reports summary statistics of commissioner-level controls. The average
of Democrati (or Republicani) confirms that the ITC is equally split between Democratic-
and Republican-appointed commissioners.
Between 1980 and 2010, the number of female and male commissioners appointed at
the ITC has been very similar, while the age of commissioners ranges from 33 to 71 years
(with an average of 52). In terms of employment background, most commissioners were
employed as legislative assistants of congressmen before being nominated at the ITC.
The number of those who came from an executive body (e.g. an undersecretary) is very
similar to the one of those who joined from the private sector (typically a law firm). Only
three commissioners were academics.
One important issue to notice is that while the votes of commissioners can be influ-
enced by their previous employment experience, future job perspectives can influence
their voting behavior on AD too. In particular, once their mandate at the ITC comes
to and end, commissioners might have a higher chance of finding certain types of jobs
depending on the voting behavior they have had during their time at the ITC. Some
commissioners had indeed influential “political” jobs after the ITC. This is the case of
commissioner Hillman who became a member of the WTO Appellate Body. Others, like
commissioner Pearson, joined the CATO institute, a think tank that is often associated
with the Republicans. So, knowing (in some detail) what commissioners do once they
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leave the ITC, could help explaining their voting behavior on AD. Unfortunately, this
information is only available for a few of them and cannot be used to systematically ana-
lyze the effect of commissioners’ career concerns on their votes on AD (see also Section 8
for a discussion on how career concerns could play a role).
Table 2: Commissioners’ Characteristics
Democratic Republican
Commissioner Employment President Gender Commissioner Employment President Gender
Alberger Legislative Carter Male Askey Legislative Clinton Female
Aranoff Legislative W. Bush Female Bedell Legislative Nixon Female
Cass Academia Reagan Male Bragg Private Sector Clinton Female
Hillman Executive Clinton Female Brunsdale Academia Reagan Female
Koplan Private Sector Clinton Male Crawford Executive Bush Female
Miller Legislative Clinton Female Devaney Private Sector W. Bush Male
Newquist Private Sector Reagan Male Eckes Legislative Bush Male
Nuzum Legislative Bush Female Frank Private Sector Reagan Male
Pinkert Executive W. Bush Male Haggart Private Sector Reagan Female
Stern Academia Carter Female Lane Executive W. Bush Female
Williamson Private Sector W. Bush Male Lodwick Executive Reagan Male
Moore Private Sector Nixon Male
Okun Legislative Clinton Female
Pearson Private Sector W. Bush Male
Watson Executive Bush Male
4.3. Senators’ Interests
To capture the influence of political parties on the voting behavior of ITC commission-
ers, I constructed variables that measure the interests of leading senators of those parties
for each ITC vote on AD during 1980-2010.
To do that, I followed several steps. Using Congressional Directory records, I first
collected the names of all senators who have been members of the Trade sub-committee,
i.e. a unit of the Finance committee dealing with trade matters. I focus on them because,
as described in Section 2.2, senators of the Finance committee play an important role in
the process leading to the appointment of ITC commissioners. Moreover, being the unit
of the Senate Finance which deals with trade matters, the Trade sub-committee frequently
interacts with the ITC.
Second, I collected data on industry-level employment in the states represented by
Trade sub-committee senators from the County Business Patterns (CBP).
Using these data, I coded a senator as being in favor of imposing an AD measure at
time t (i.e. the time when the ITC takes its final decision on material injury) on a product
belonging to industry k if, at time t, industry k belongs to the top 10 industries in terms
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of employment in the state in which the senator is elected.19 Based on this information,
I define the dummy variables PressureDemtk and Pressure
Rep
tk , which are respectively equal
to 1 if there is at least one Democratic or Republican senator (i.e. j = 1, ..., M, where
M indicates the maximum number of Trade sub-committee senators) in the Trade sub-
committee who is in favor of imposing an AD measure on industry k at time t (senatorDemjkt
or senatorRepjkt ):
20
PressureDemkt =

1 if
M
∑
j=1
senatorDemjkt ≥ 1
0 otherwise
PressureRepkt =

1 if
M
∑
j=1
senatorRepjkt ≥ 1
0 otherwise.
(1)
The idea behind these dummies is that senators in the Trade sub-committee are in the
position to influence the voting behavior of ITC commissioners, particularly those who
have been appointed by their party.21 They are more likely to put pressure in favor of AD
if the decision involves a key industry in their state.22
To match senators’ trade policy interests to a given AD vote, the products under in-
vestigation had to be mapped into the industry (k) they belong to. In doing that, the votes
of 15 petitions were coded as missing and dropped from the sample. This is because the
product belonged to more than one 2-digit SIC or 3-digit NAICS industry. Moreover,
mainly because CBP (employment) data contain very little information for agricultural
19Results (not reported here to save space) do not change if key industries are defined as those belonging
to the top 20 in terms of employment.
20The pressure variables are constructed to capture the interest of senators belonging to each of the two
parties. Other papers (e.g. Moore, 1992) have highlighted that the Senate can put pressure on the ITC when
AD measures protect key industries of senators: the main novelty in this paper is to model this channel as
being party-specific.
21The main advantage of defining the pressure variables as dummies is that they allow for an easier in-
terpretation of the results. In Section 7, I will show that the results are robust to using alternative measures.
22Industries are identified based on 2-digit SIC codes (for years before 1998) or 3-digit NAICS industry
(for years from 1998 onwards). The choice of aggregating employment at 2-digit SIC and 3-digit NAICS
is first driven by data comparability over time. While state-level employment is available at 4-digit SIC
for years between 1986 and 1997 and at 6-digit NAICS from 1998 onwards, for years before 1986 it is only
available at 2-digit SIC. However, mixing detailed NAICS and SIC employment data might be problem-
atic (see Pierce and Schott, 2012), while aggregating at 2 and 3 digits should ensure a higher degree of
harmonization over the different years the sample spans. Moreover, since employment figures in the CBP
are withheld when their disclosure would allow the identification of firms, using 2-digit SIC and 3-digit
NAICS data, rather than at more disaggregated levels, reduces the presence of undisclosed data. Also,
when employment data are not disclosed, a flag gives the interval where the actual data belongs to. Fol-
lowing Conconi et al. (2014), I used these flags to input values (i.e. the midpoint between the 2 extreme
values of each interval) for the missing observations.
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products, 34 petitions (250 votes) were not matched with the pressure variables.
Notice that in constructing the pressure variables, I exploit several sources of vari-
ation. First, the size and the composition of the Trade sub-committee vary over time:
the Standing Rules of the Senate do not explicitly limit the size of sub-committees which
are determined by the full Finance committee. So, for instance, during 1980-2010 it has
changed considerably, ranging from a minimum of 11 members in years from 2008 to
2010 to 17 in years from 1987 to 1994.23 The composition of the Trade sub-committee also
varies according to which states are represented and to which parties represent them. So,
for example, when comparing two votes in a given case, say on a steel-related product,
one may happen when a senator from a steel producing state (like Pennsylvania) sits
in the Trade sub-committee and one when there is no senator from that state. Finally,
within-state changes in employment, over time, determine whether a given industry is
key for Trade sub-committee senators. For example, in two votes on the same product
at different times, the same state may be represented in the Trade sub-committee but,
employment in the industry to which the product belongs might not be high enough for
that industry to be ranked in the top ones. This is for instance the case for the votes on
automotive glass windshields in 2000 and 2002: while Senator Lott, a Republican from
Mississippi, was representing his state in the Trade sub-committee in both years, only in
2002 the level of employment in the transportation equipment manufacturing industry
was such that the industry was ranked as key.
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for PressureReptk and Pressure
Dem
tk : the relatively
low values of the averages (0.154 and 0.198) indicate that only in a few cases there is at
least one Trade sub-committee senator whose trade policy interests are heavily linked to
the ITC vote.
5. Does Party Affiliation Matter?
In this section, I look at the relation between the political party affiliation of the ap-
pointed ITC commissioners and their final votes on AD. I estimate the following Linear
Probability (LP) and Probit models:
Voteikct = β0 + β1Democrati + β2Xit + δt + ϑk + γc + eikct (2)
Pr(Voteikct = 1) = Φ[β0 + β1Democrati + β2Xit + δt + ϑk + γc]. (3)
23Table A1 in the Appendix lists the number of Trade sub-committee members per each year of the
sample.
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The dependent variable, Voteikct, is the vote of commissioner i, at time t, on whether to
protect industry k from products allegedly unfairly imported from country c. It equals
1 if the commissioner votes in favor of AD and 0 otherwise. The dummy Democrati is
the variable of interest and captures the party affiliation of commissioners. Xit contains
a set of commissioners’ characteristics (i.e. gender, the age of commissioner i at the time
t, and the employment background).24 δt and ϑk are respectively time and industry fixed
effects (at 3 digits of NAICS).25 γc are fixed effects for the countries whose firms have
(allegedly) unfairly exported the product under investigation to the US (hereafter called
target-country fixed effects).26 eikct is the error term. In equation (3), Φ(·) is the cumula-
tive normal function. To allow for correlation in the views of commissioners on a request
for protection, errors are clustered at petition level (results obtained by clustering at dif-
ferent dimensions are discussed in the Section 7).
When the dependent variable is binary, using a probit model is a natural choice: this
takes into account residuals’ heteroscedasticity and ensures that the predicted probabili-
ties are between 0 and 1. However, when specifications include fixed effects, one of the
advantages of estimating a LP model is that the size of the sample is not reduced, i.e. no
observations are lost (this is instead what happens when one uses a probit model and the
outcome does not vary at some levels of the independent variables). Since there are pros
and cons in using the two econometric methodologies, I will always show the results of
both probit and LP regressions.27
The results can be found in Table 3. The estimates of the LP model are in Panel A,
while those of the probit model are in Panel B (to ease the interpretation of the coefficients,
I report the marginal effects computed as means of marginal effects at each observation).
In the first three columns of each panel, I report the results of minimalist specifica-
tions, in which I include only the key regressor of interest and different sets of fixed
effects.
24See Section 4 for a detailed description of the variables used in the regressions of this section.
25As mentioned in Section 4, industries are identified based on 2-digit SIC codes for years before 1998
or 3-digit NAICS industry for years from 1998 onwards. When including industry fixed effects in the
regressions, one has to convert all the industries to NAICS or SIC codes. I will always report the results
obtained using 3-digit NAICS fixed effects. However, results are unaffected if I instead include them at 2
digits of NAICS or at 2 or 3 digits of SIC.
26A list of the target countries is provided in Table A2 of the Appendix.
27When fixed effects are included in a probit specification, estimates could suffer from the incidental
parameters bias, i.e. yield biased coefficients and standard errors (Lancaster, 2000). Notice, however, that
this is not the case in equation (3), where the sets of fixed effects always refer to a more aggregate dimension
than the unit of the analysis, i.e. commissioners’ votes (see Table 3).
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Table 3: Commissioners’ Characteristics and Votes on AD
Panel A: LPM Panel B: Probit
Voteikct (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Democrati 0.093∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.021) (0.018) (0.012) (0.023) (0.019)
Femalei -0.004 -0.009 -0.007 -0.015 -0.056∗ -0.048∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.029) (0.024)
Ageit -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Legislativei -0.131∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.027) (0.022)
Executivei -0.132∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.031) (0.026)
Academiai -0.285∗∗∗ -0.274∗∗∗ -0.277∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗ -0.463∗∗∗ -0.363∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.038) (0.035) (0.032) (0.057) (0.048)
Observations 3,983 3,983 3,983 3,983 3,983 3,983 3,893 2,010 2,482 3,893 2,010 2,482
R2 0.177 0.581 0.450 0.207 0.609 0.478
Pseudo R2 0.140 0.202 0.149 0.166 0.295 0.202
Predicted Probability 0.636 0.528 0.559 0.636 0.529 0.559
3-digit Industry FE Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No
Target-Country FE Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No
Year FE Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No
Petition FE No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Case FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
The table reports coefficients of a LPM (columns (1)-(6)) and marginal effects of probit regressions , computed as means of marginal effects at each observation
(columns (7)-(12)). Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors, clustered at petition level, are in parentheses. Voteikct is 1 if commissioner
i, at time t, votes in favor of granting AD to a product belonging to industry k, imported from country c; it is 0 otherwise. Republicani is omitted. Employment
background categories are mutually exclusive. Privatei is omitted.
I start by including a set of time, industry and target-country effects.28 I then report
the results of more demanding specifications, in which I replace time, industry and target-
country effects with either petition or case fixed effects. Including petition fixed effects ac-
counts for the whole variation in characteristics of requests for AD protection that have
been filed against a specific country.29 The difference with AD case fixed effects is that the
latter control instead for the characteristics of petitions that have been filed, for the same
product, against more than one country, at the same time.30 Irrespective of the econometric
methodology used and the fixed effects included, I find that the estimated coefficient for the
variable Democrati is always positive and highly significant. Thus, Democratic-appointed
commissioners are always more protectionist than Republican-appointed ones.
However, the size of the effect (i.e. the coefficient of the variable Democrati) is gener-
ally smaller when using LP, ranging from 7.9 (column (4)) to 10.7 (column (2)) percentage
points. Probit estimates yield instead an effect spanning from 12 (column (10)) to 39 (column
8) percentage points.31 These effects are higher (both with respect to the other LP and pro-
bit results shown in Table 3) when petition and case fixed effects are included in the probit
specifications. In fact, while this allows to control for any unobserved characteristic at the
petition and the case level, it also reduces the number of observations dramatically. Never-
theless, the fact that even in the case of these very demanding specifications, Democrati is
systematically positive and significant, it is an indication that commissioners’ party affilia-
tion is a crucial determinant of their voting behavior on AD.
The role of party affiliation is robust to the inclusion of additional commissioners’ char-
acteristics. In particular, even if their magnitudes are slightly reduced (columns from (4) to
(6) for LP and columns from (10) to (12)), the coefficients on Democrati remain positive and
strongly significant. The variable Femalei is never significant, suggesting that the gender
of commissioners has no effect on their voting behavior on AD. Ageit is instead negatively
associated with the probability of voting in favor of AD, showing that older commissioners
are less protectionist.
The results of Table 3 suggest that political parties can affect AD policy by appointing
ITC commissioners who have similar views on trade policy. I refer to this as the selection
effect of political parties.
28Estimates reported in Table 3 are obtained with 3-digit NAICS fixed effects. However, results are unaf-
fected if industry fixed effects are included at 2 digits of NAICS or at 2/3 digits of SIC.
29A list of the petitioning industries can be found in Table A3 of the Appendix.
30When petition and case fixed effects are included in the models, the LP and probit specifications become
Voteikct = β0 + β1Democrati + β2Xit + µFE + eikct
Pr(Voteikct = 1) = Φ[β0 + β1Democrati + β2Xit + µFE]
where µFE is either petition or case fixed effects (all the other variables are defined as in equations (2) and (3)).
31These effects are computed by taking the ratio between the marginal effects of the variable Democrati and
the predicted probabilities of voting affirmatively on AD (Table 3).
15
6. Does Party Pressure Matter?
In the previous section, I have shown that Democratic-appointed commissioners are
more protectionist than Republican-appointed ones. This result suggests that one channel
through which political parties can influence ITC voting on AD is by selecting commission-
ers whose stance on trade policy is similar to theirs.
In this section, I show that a second channel might also be at work: parties can exert
their influence on ITC commissioners when they are in office. To show this, I include in
the regressions the dummy variables PressureDemkt and Pressure
Rep
kt and interact them with
commissioners’ party affiliation (the dummy Democrati). This allows me to link the interests
of leading Democratic and Republican senators of the Senate Trade sub-committee, to AD
votes.32 I estimate the following LP and Probit models:
Voteikct = β0 + β1Democrati + β2Xit + β3PressureDemkt + β4Pressure
Rep
kt + (4)
+β5PressureDemkt × Democrati + β6PressureRepkt × Democrati + δt + ϑk + γc + eikct
Pr(Voteikct = 1) = Φ[β0 + β1Democrati + β2Xit + β3PressureDemkt + β4Pressure
Rep
kt + (5)
+β5PressureDemkt × Democrati + β6PressureRepkt × Democrati + δt + ϑk + γc].
As discussed in Section 4, the idea is that, if the petitioning industry is key (in terms of
employment) in the states in which senators who belong to the Trade sub-committee are
elected, they might put pressure on the commissioners appointed by their party in order
to protect their constituency. If this is the case, one would expect the estimated coefficients
of β4 (which captures the pressure on Republican senators on Republican-appointed ITC
commissioners) and β5 (which captures the pressure on Democratic senators on Democratic-
appointed ITC commissioners) to be positive and significant.
In equations (4) and (5), I thus examine how party pressure affects the voting behav-
ior of different ITC commissioners. The dummies capturing party influence vary with the
composition of the Trade sub-committee and with the petitioning industry. Importantly, to
account for unobserved characteristics of commissioners that might affect their voting be-
havior on AD and be correlated with the pressure variables, I estimate a Linear Probability
32The pressure variables are equal 1 to if there is at least one Democratic/Republican member of Trade sub-
committee of the Finance committee, who is elected in states where, at time t, the product under investigation
belongs to the top 10 industries in terms of employment (equation (1)). In the robustness section, I will show
that findings are in line if the stake variables are instead constructed as the number or the shares of Trade
sub-committee senators who care about the outcome of an ITC vote.
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Model (LPM) that includes commissioner fixed effects (ϕi):33
Voteikct = α0 + α1PressureDemkt + α2Pressure
Rep
kt + α3Pressure
Dem
kt × Democrati+ (6)
+α4Pressure
Rep
kt × Democrati + ϕi + δt + ϑk + γc + eikct.
In these regressions, I exploit the fact that the vote of individual ITC commissioners on AD
changed depending on the trade interests of key senators in their party.34 If ITC commis-
sioners are influenced by their parties, then α3 and α2 should be positive and significant.
The results are reported in Table 4. In all specifications, I find that the estimated coeffi-
cients of the variable PressureRepkt and the interaction term Pressure
Dem
kt × Democrati are posi-
tive and significant. This finding indicates that political parties can have a pressure effect on
AD: the probability that ITC commissioners vote in favor of protection is significantly higher
when leading senators in the party that appointed them support this measure. Importantly,
the pressure effect is also confirmed in column (3) of Table 4, where any time-invariant un-
observed characteristics of commissioners (e.g. their state of origin or education) that might
affect their voting behavior on AD (and be correlated with the pressure variables) are ab-
sorbed by commissioner fixed effects.
The coefficients of interest are thus positive and statistically significant both when using
LP and probit. However, interactions must be cautiously interpreted when using probit:
their values may have different signs for different values of the covariates (Ai and Norton,
2003). This is the case also in Table 4 where the magnitude, the sign and statistical signif-
icance of marginal effects vary depending on the values of Democrati and on those of the
pressure variables (column (2) of Table 4).
When no Trade sub-committee senators care about a vote of the ITC on AD, the effect
of Democrati is positive and statistically significant but much smaller than the same effect
when at least one Democratic Trade sub-committee senator (and no Republicans) has a stake
in a vote on AD (8 vs. 25 percentage points). The effect is instead negative and statistically
significant when at least one Republican senator (and no Democrats) is interested in the
outcome of an ITC vote: being a Democratic-appointed commissioner when PressureDemkt is
equal to 0 and PressureRepkt is equal to 1, decreases the probability of voting in favor of AD
by 7.2 percentage points. When both PressureDemkt and Pressure
Rep
kt are equal to 1, the same
probability increases by 9.4 percentage points. Moreover, the effects of PressureDemkt and
PressureRepkt on the probability of voting affirmatively on AD, when Democrati equals 0 are -
33Notice that when commissioner fixed effects are included, using a probit model rises concerns about the
incidental parameters problem: the unit of observation and the dimension of the fixed effects coincide. For
this reason, whenever commissioner effects are included in the regressions, only the results of LP models are
reported.
34Consider, for instance, the behavior of Democratic-appointed commissioner Miller on petitions filed on
the behalf of the Primary Metal industry, an historically important industry in the US. When no Democratic
senators of the Trade sub-committee had a stake in those investigations (e.g. in 2000), commissioner Miller’s
votes were almost equally split between affirmative and negative ones. On the contrary, when the industry
was key in states represented by leading senators of his party (i.e. in 2003), his vote was always is favor of
granting protection.
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8 and 14.9 percentage points. If instead Democrati is equal to 1, the change in the probability
of voting in favor of AD associated with is of 9.2 percentage points for PressureDemkt and not
significant for PressureRepkt .
Table 4: Party Pressure and Votes on AD
LPM Probit LPM
Voteikct (1) (2) (3)
Democrati 0.082∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013)
PressureDemkt -0.093
∗ -0.081∗ -0.098∗∗
(0.049) (0.047) (0.050)
PressureRepkt 0.150
∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.045) (0.047)
PressureDemkt × Democrati 0.186∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.041) (0.044)
PressureRepkt × Democrati -0.162∗∗∗ -0.155∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.035)
Femalei -0.001 -0.012
(0.015) (0.015)
Ageit -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Legislativei -0.126∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015)
Executivei -0.127∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017)
Academiai -0.279∗∗∗ -0.260∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.033)
ME of Democrati at PressureDemkt =0 and Pressure
Rep
kt =0 0.080
∗∗∗
[0.053,0.107]
ME of Democrati at PressureDemkt =1 and Pressure
Rep
kt =0 0.254
∗∗∗
[0.175,0.333]
ME of Democrati at PressureDemkt =0 and Pressure
Rep
kt =1 -0.072
∗∗
[-0.128,-0.017]
ME of Democrati at PressureDemkt =1 and Pressure
Rep
kt =1 0.094
∗∗
[0.019,0.169]
ME of PressureDemkt at Democrati=0 -0.083
∗
[-0.177,0.012]
ME of PressureRepkt at Democrati=0 0.149
∗∗∗
[0.059,0.239]
ME of PressureDemkt at Democrati=1 0.092
∗
[-0.062, 0.190]
ME of PressureRepkt at Democrati=1 -0.007
[-0.098, 0.083]
Observations 3,983 3,893 3,983
R2 0.214 0.241
Pseudo R2 0.173
Predicted Probability 0.646
3-digit Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Target-Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Commissioner FE No No Yes
Column (1) and (3) report coefficients of a LPM while column (2) lists marginal effects of probit regres-
sions, computed as means of marginal effects at each observation. Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01. Standard errors, clustered at petition level are in parentheses. Column (2) also reports
the marginal effects of the pressure variables (Democrati) computed at the different values of Democrati
(pressure variables); confidence intervals are in squared brackets. Voteikct is 1 if commissioner i, at time
t, votes in favor of granting AD to a product belonging to industry k, imported from country c; it is 0
otherwise. Republicani is omitted. Employment background categories are mutually exclusive. Privatei
is omitted.
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Overall, the marginal effects reported in Table 4, indicate that, in voting on AD, both
Democratic and Republican-appointed commissioners are sensitive to the interests of Trade
sub-committee senators of the party they are associated to (the pressure effect).35
The pressure effect of political parties also emerges from Table 5, in which I report the
predicted probabilities of voting in favor of AD (first part of the table) and their differences
for different values of the pressure variables and their interactions (second part of the table).
First, comparing the predicted probabilities associated to Democratic and Republican-
appointed commissioners, it is clear that the first ones are statistically more protectionist,
except in one case: when Republican senators have a stake in AD votes and Democratic
senators do not.
Table 5: Predicted Probabilities (PPs) of Voting in Favor of AD
Values of the
Pressure Variables P̂rob
Dem
[·] P̂robRep[·] Observations
[0, 0] 0.660 0.580 2,795
[1, 0] 0.748 0.494 284
[0, 1] 0.653 0.725 512
[1, 1] 0.741 0.647 384
Differences in PPs
of Voting in Favor of AD
P̂rob
Dem
[0, 0]− P̂robRep[0, 0] 0.080***
P̂rob
Dem
[1, 0]− P̂robRep[1, 0] 0.254***
P̂rob
Dem
[0, 1]− P̂robRep[0, 1] -0.072
P̂rob
Dem
[1, 1]− P̂robRep[1, 1] 0.094***
P̂rob
Dem
[0, 0]− P̂robDem[1, 0] -0.080**
P̂rob
Rep
[0, 0]− P̂robRep[0, 1] -0.145***
P̂rob
Rep
[1, 0]− P̂robRep[0, 0] -0.086*
P̂rob
Rep
[1, 0]− P̂robRep[1, 1] -0.153***
P̂rob
Dem
[0, 0]− P̂robDem[0, 1] 0.007
P̂rob
Dem
[1, 0]− P̂robDem[1, 1] 0.007
The table reports predicted probabilities (PPs) of voting in favor of AD and their dif-
ferences calculated at different values of the pressure variables and their interactions.
Probabilities are computed on the results of column (2) of Table 4. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at 1%, 5% and 10
So, even if Republican-appointed commissioners are generally less protectionist, when
the industry asking to be protected is important in the states represented by Republican
35The results of Table 4 also show that Democratic-appointed commissioners are overall more protec-
tionist than Republican-appointed ones: the hypothesis Democrat + PressureDemkt × Democrati + Pressure
Rep
kt× Democrati=0 is always strongly rejected. The value of the F statistic is 7.74 for the LPM in column (1). The
χ2 for the probit specification is 5.65 in column (2). Moreover, the sign, significance and magnitude of the
coefficients and the marginal effects attached to other commissioners characteristics in columns (1) and (2) of
Table 4 are largely comparable to those of Table 3. In particular, Femalei is never significant; Ageit decreases
the probability of voting in favor of AD, and commissioners who last job, before the ITC, was in the private
sector (academia), are the most (least) protectionist.
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senators, they become more protectionist (first part of Table 5). In particular, the third row
of the second part of Table 5 also shows that when only republican senators care, there is no
statistical difference between P̂rob
Dem
[0, 1] and P̂rob
Rep
[0, 1].
Moreover, the first rows of both parts of Table 5 also confirm the existence the selection
effect discussed in Section 5: P̂rob
Dem
[0, 0] is larger than P̂rob
Rep
[0, 0] and their difference
is statistically significant, indicating that when no senator cares, ITC commissioners vote
according to the trade policy preferences of the parties they are linked to.
In addition, when Democratic or Republican senators have a stake in AD votes, the
predicted probabilities associated to the commissioners of their political area are higher
(0.660 vs. 0.748 for Democratic-appointed commissioners; 0.580 vs. 0.725 for Republican-
appointed ones) and statistically different from each other (rows one and two of Table 5).
This suggests that the selection effect can be strengthened by the pressure effect: when key
industries ask for AD protection, ITC commissioners are more influenceable by the parties
that appointed them.
Interestingly, Republican-appointed commissioners change their behavior depending
on whether Democratic senators are interested in a vote of the ITC: P̂rob
Rep
[1, 0] is lower
(and statistically different from) than P̂rob
Rep
[0, 0] and P̂rob
Rep
[1, 1]. This is not the case
for Democratic-appointed commissioners: P̂rob
Dem
[0, 0] and P̂rob
Dem
[0, 1] (and P̂rob
Dem
[1, 0]
and P̂rob
Dem
[1, 1]) are not statistically different from each other, indicating that Republican-
appointed commissioners are more influenceable when Democratic senators do not care.
7. Robustness
To assess the strength of the results presented earlier, in this section, I perform a number
of robustness checks using different definitions of the pressure variables and clustering the
at different dimensions.
The pressure variables used in Section 6 are constructed as dummies equal to 1 if at
least one Democratic/Republican Trade subcommittee senator has a stake in a given AD
vote at time t. To exclude that the results presented in Section 6 are driven by the way
pressure variables are defined, I run the same regressions presented in Table 4, using two
more definitions of the those variables.
First, I re-define them as the number Democratic and Republican Trade sub-committee
senators with an interest at time t (CountDemkt and Count
Rep
kt ). This takes into account the
full variation in the composition of the Trade sub-committee. Second, as the ratio between
Democratic and Republican senators with an interest in an ITC vote and the total number
of senators of the Trade sub-committee at time t (ShareDemkt and Share
Rep
kt ): shares keep into
account that the size of the Trade sub-committee varies over time (see Table A1 in the Ap-
pendix).
Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 6.
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Table 6: Summary statistics
(Alternative Definitions of the Pressure Variables)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations
CountDemkt 0.241 0.816 0 9 3,983
CountRepkt 0.257 0.608 0 5 3,983
ShareDemkt 0.015 0.050 0 0.529 3,983
ShareRepkt 0.016 0.038 0 0.294 3,983
The relatively low averages of the pressure variables reflect the fact that in many cases
the number of Democratic/Republican senators with a stake in an AD vote is either 0 or 1
(the number of times in which the pressure variables take either value 0 or 1 account for
roughly 96% of the cases).
The results using the re-defined pressure variables are shown in Table 7. Democrati is
always positive and significant both the panels, confirming the existence of a selection effect
whereby the ITC commissioners’ voting behavior on AD mimics the trade preferences of the
appointing parties.
Moreover, the coefficients and the marginal effects on the interactions CountDemkt × Democrati
and ShareDemkt × Democrati are always positive and significant. This is also the case for
CountRepkt and Share
Rep
kt : the presence of the pressure effect is thus strongly confirmed.
36 The
coefficients and the marginal effects on other commissioners’ characteristics are almost iden-
tical to those reported in Table 4.37
As a final check, I assess the sensitivity of the results to changes in the clustering di-
mensions. All the regressions results presented earlier have been obtained by clustering the
errors at petition level. However, errors can also be correlated at different dimensions. First,
different AD votes of the same commissioner are likely to be correlated to his preferences
and characteristics.
Also, commissioners might care more about protecting some industries than others. In
Table 8, I run the same regressions of Table 3, allowing for correlation at commissioner level
in columns (1)-(3) and (7)-(9) and at (3-digit) industry level in columns (4)-(6) and (10)-(12).
The significance of the coefficients and the marginal effects on Democrati is never affected
by the change in clustering dimensions in all the twelve specifications. This confirms that
commissioners tend to vote according to the preferences of the parties that appointed them
(selection effect).38
36Democratic-appointed commissioners are overall more protectionist than Republican-appointed ones:
the hypotheses Democrati + CountDemkt × Democrati + Count
Rep
kt × Democrati and Democrati + ShareDemkt
× Democrati + ShareRepkt × Democrati are always strongly rejected for the specifications reported in columns
(1), (2), (4) and (5) of Table 7 (F and χ2 tests are computed at the mean of the pressure variables).
37The set of findings obtained using the number and the shares of Trade sub-committee senators are con-
firmed if their interests are defined relative to the top 20 industries in terms of employment.
38Results are unaffected if correlation is allowed at the 2 digits of NAICS or at industry and commissioner
level at the same time, i.e. if errors are double-clustered (see Petersen, 2009; Cameron and Trivedi, 2010;
Cameron et al., 2011).
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Table 7: Party Pressure and Votes on AD, (Number and Shares of Senators)
LPM Probit LPM LPM Probit LPM
Voteikct (1) (2) (3) Voteikct (4) (5) (6)
CountDemkt -0.029
∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ ShareDemkt -0.005
∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
CountRepkt 0.064
∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ ShareRepkt 0.010
∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
CountDemkt × Democrati 0.026∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.023∗∗ ShareDemkt × Democrati 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
CountRepkt × Democrati -0.049∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ Share
Rep
kt × Democrati -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Democrati 0.092∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Femalei -0.006 -0.016 -0.005 -0.016
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Ageit -0.004∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Legislativei -0.129∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Executivei -0.130∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Academiai -0.277∗∗∗ -0.257∗∗∗ -0.277∗∗∗ -0.257∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.033) (0.035) (0.033)
Observations 3,983 3,893 3,983 3,983 3,893 3,983
R2 0.214 0.241 0.214 0.241
Pseudo R2 0.172 0.172
Predicted Probability 0.636 0.636
3-digit Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target-Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commissioner FE No No Yes No No Yes
Column (1), (3), (5) and (6) report coefficients of a LPM while columns (2) and (4) lists marginal effects of probit regressions,
computed as means of marginal effects at each observation. Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors,
clustered at petition level are in parentheses. Voteikct is 1 if commissioner i, at time t, votes in favor of granting AD to a product
belonging to industry k, imported from country c; it is 0 otherwise. Republicani is omitted. Employment background categories
are mutually exclusive. Privatei is omitted.
Table 8: Commissioners’ Characteristics and Votes on AD (Different Clustering Dimensions)
LPM Probit
Voteikct (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Democrati 0.079∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.034) (0.032) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.031) (0.059) (0.053) (0.025) (0.033) (0.039)
Femalei -0.004 -0.009 -0.007 -0.004 -0.009 -0.007 -0.015 -0.056 -0.048 -0.015 -0.056 -0.048
(0.048) (0.054) (0.052) (0.046) (0.051) (0.049) (0.047) (0.085) (0.075) (0.048) (0.084) (0.074)
Ageit -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.005∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.005∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Legislativei -0.131∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗ -0.120∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗ -0.167∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.054) (0.052) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034) (0.045) (0.088) (0.075) (0.032) (0.074) (0.054)
Executivei -0.132∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗ -0.117∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗ -0.117∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗ -0.180∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗ -0.180∗∗
(0.046) (0.053) (0.050) (0.046) (0.046) (0.044) (0.046) (0.087) (0.077) (0.044) (0.084) (0.071)
Academiai -0.285∗∗∗ -0.274∗∗∗ -0.277∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗ -0.274∗∗ -0.277∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗ -0.463∗∗∗ -0.363∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗ -0.463∗∗ -0.363∗∗
(0.078) (0.093) (0.088) (0.121) (0.134) (0.126) (0.072) (0.136) (0.122) (0.117) (0.231) (0.178)
Observations 3,983 3,983 3,983 3,983 3,983 3,983 3,893 2,010 2,482 3,893 2,010 2,482
R2 0.177 0.581 0.450 0.207 0.609 0.478
Pseudo R2 0.140 0.202 0.149 0.166 0.295 0.202
Predicted Probability 0.636 0.528 0.559 0.636 0.529 0.559
Clustering (Commissioner) Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No
Clustering (Industry) No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
3-digit Industry FE Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No
Target-Country FE Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No
Year FE Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No
Petition FE No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Case FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
The table reports coefficients of a LPM (columns (1)-(6)) and marginal effects of probit regressions computed as means of marginal effects at each observation (columns
(7)-(12)). Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at commissioner level in columns (1)-(3) and (7)-(9) and at 3-digit
industry level in columns (4)-(6) and (9)-(12)). Voteikct is 1 if commissioner i, at time t, votes in favor of granting AD to a product belonging to industry k, imported from
country c; it is 0 otherwise. Republicani is omitted. Employment background categories are mutually exclusive. Privatei is omitted.
Table 9: Party Pressure and Votes on AD (Different Clustering Dimensions)
LPM Probit LPM
Voteikct (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PressureDemkt -0.093
∗∗∗ -0.093∗ -0.081∗∗ -0.081 -0.098∗∗∗ -0.098∗
(0.032) (0.051) (0.032) (0.050) (0.033) (0.053)
PressureRepkt 0.150
∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.137∗
(0.048) (0.072) (0.042) (0.073) (0.052) (0.080)
PressureDemkt × Democrati 0.186∗∗ 0.186∗ 0.175∗∗ 0.175∗ 0.193∗∗ 0.193∗
(0.073) (0.110) (0.069) (0.101) (0.071) (0.103)
PressureRepkt × Democrati -0.162∗∗∗ -0.162∗ -0.155∗∗∗ -0.155∗∗ -0.134∗∗ -0.134∗
(0.052) (0.083) (0.049) (0.076) (0.058) (0.077)
Democrati 0.082∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.019) (0.038) (0.021)
Femalei -0.001 -0.001 -0.012 -0.012
(0.046) (0.042) (0.045) (0.044)
Ageit -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Legislativei -0.126∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.038) (0.045) (0.035)
Executivei -0.127∗∗ -0.127∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.048) (0.045) (0.045)
Academiai -0.279∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗ -0.260∗∗∗ -0.260∗∗
(0.076) (0.115) (0.070) (0.113)
Observations 3,983 3,983 3,893 3,893 3,983 3,983
R2 0.214 0.214 0.241 0.241
Pseudo R2 0.173 0.173
Predicted Probability 0.646 0.646
Clustering (Commissioner) Yes No Yes No Yes No
Clustering (Industry) No Yes No Yes No Yes
3-digit Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target-Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commissioner FE No No No No Yes Yes
Column (1), (2), (5) and (6) report coefficients of a LPM. Columns (3) and (4) report marginal effects of a probit
model computed as means of marginal effects at each observation. Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01. Standard errors, clustered at commissioner (columns (1), (3) and (5)) and 3-digit NAICS level
(columns (2), (4) and (6)), are in parentheses. Voteikct is 1 if commissioner i, at time t, votes in favor of granting
AD to a product belonging to industry k, imported from country c; it is 0 otherwise. Republicani is omitted.
Employment background categories are mutually exclusive. Privatei is omitted.
Consistently with the results shown in Section 5, Femalei is never significant. The coef-
ficients on Ageit confirm that overall age affects negatively the probability of imposing an
AD measure (the significance is reduced in some cases). Employment background’s con-
trols show that commissioners who were lately employed in the private sector (academia)
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were the most (least) protectionist (in line with the results of Table 3).
Finally, the results presented in Table 9 confirm the findings on party pressure: al-
though the significance of the key regressors is sometimes reduced, the coefficients at-
tached to them remain significant at conventional levels, leaving the general picture un-
changed.39
8. Conclusions
This paper studies the effect of partisanship on US AD policy. I focus on the voting
behavior of the ITC, a quasi-judicial agency composed by six non-elected commission-
ers who are supposed to conduct material injury investigations in a fair and objective
manner.
Using a newly collected dataset containing all ITC commissioners’ votes on AD over
the period 1980-2010, this study shows that political parties can affect the ITC voting
behavior. While other studies have emphasised that Congress can influence the ITC, the
novelty of this paper is to show that this influence is party-specific. Political parties can
influence AD policy in two ways.
First, Democratic-appointed commissioners are consistently more protectionist than
Republican-appointed ones. This effect is sizable (the probability of voting in favor of AD
is from 8 to 39 percentage points higher for Democratic-appointed commissioners) and
suggests that political parties can play an important role on AD policy by selecting ITC
commissioners who have a similar stance on trade policy as their own (selection effect).
This result is robust to several changes in the econometric specifications and to the use of
different methodologies.
Second, whether (Democratic) Republican-appointed commissioners vote in favor of
AD depends crucially on whether the petitioning industry is key (in terms of employ-
ment) in the states represented by leading Trade sub-committee (Democratic) Republican
senators at the time (pressure effect). Importantly, this result holds when controlling for
any unobserved time-invariant characteristic of ITC commissioners (e.g. the state of ori-
gin) that could influence their votes on AD and be correlated with the pressure variables,
i.e. when commissioner fixed effects are included in the specifications.
39The hypothesis Democrat + PressureDemkt × Democrati + Pressure
Rep
kt × Democrati=0 is always rejected
for the specifications reported in columns (1)-(4) of Table 9, confirming that Democratic-appointed commis-
sioners are overall more protectionist then Republican-appointed ones. Both the selection and the pressure
effect are confirmed at conventional levels of significance also when errors are clustered at AD case level.
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The analysis indicates that both parties, when they care, tend to exert protectionist
influence on the ITC commissioners, suggesting that electoral motives could play a role
in determining the intensity of this pressure (see Conconi et al., 2014). Indeed, even
Republican-appointed commissioners who are generally less protectionist than Democratic-
appointed ones, are more likely to vote in favor of AD if the measure shields key indus-
tries in states where leading Republican senators are elected.
More research is needed to further detect the mechanisms behind the voting behavior
of the different commissioners. If more information on their post-ITC careers were to
come available, it could be used to investigate whether career concerns also play a role in
shaping their voting behavior on AD, e.g. by checking whether the way some commis-
sioners vote is correlated with the likelihood of getting a certain (political?) job once they
leave the ITC (see for instance i Vidal et al., 2012).
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9. Appendix
Table A1: Size of the Trade sub-committee
# of senators Period
11 2007-2010
12 1980
14 1995-1996, 2005-2006
15 1981-1986, 2003-2004
16 2001-2002
17 1987-1994
Table A2: List of Target Countries
Argentina (69) Hong Kong (7) Russia (55)
Australia (26) Hungary (10) Singapore (31)
Austria (24) India (141) Slovakia (4)
Bangladesh (5) Indonesia (76) South Africa (64)
Belarus (10) Iran (5) South Korea (251)
Belgium (47) Israel (19) Spain (78)
Brazil (196) Italy (154) Sweden (47)
Canada (171) Japan (454) Taiwan (252)
Chile (15) Kazakhstan (27) Tajikistan (6)
China (665) Latvia (6) Thailand (86)
Colombia (26) Luxembourg (5) Trinidad & Tobago (12)
Costa Rica (16) Malaysia (41) Turkey (29)
Czech Republic (6) Mexico (103) USSR (5)
East Germany (2) Moldova (11) Ukraine (49)
Ecuador (28) Netherlands (33) United Arab Emirates (6)
Egypt (6) New Zealand (14) United Kingdom (99)
El Salvador (10) Norway (4) Venezuela (56)
Finland (10) Philippines (10) Vietnam (21)
France (138) Poland (16) West Germany (60)
Germany (112) Portugal (5) Yugoslavia (8)
Greece (6) Romania (46)
The table reports the list of countries whose products exported to the US have
been under AD investigation over the sample period. Figures in parentheses
indicate the number of commissioners’ votes.
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Table A3: List of Petitioning Industries
Industry Code Industry Group # of votes
(SIC87)
10 Metal Mining 16
14 Mining And Quarrying Of Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels 17
17 Construction Special Trade Contractors 15
20 Food And Kindred Products 47
22 Textile Mill Products 46
23 Apparel And Other Finished Products Made From Fabrics
And Similar Materials 17
25 Furniture And Fixtures 16
26 Paper And Allied Products 24
28 Chemicals And Allied Products 303
29 Petroleum Refining And Related Industries 3
30 Rubber And Miscellaneous Plastics Products 107
32 Stone, Clay, Glass, And Concrete Products 41
33 Primary Metal Industries 873
34 Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery
And Transportation Equipment 282
35 Industrial And Commercial Machinery
And Computer Equipment 222
36 Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment
And Components, Except Computer Equipment 139
37 Transportation Equipment 51
38 Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling Instruments;
Photographic, Medical And Optical Goods; Watches And Clocks 51
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 21
50 Wholesale Trade-durable Goods 25
51 Wholesale Trade-non-durable Goods 27
55 Automotive Dealers And Gasoline Service Stations 6
59 Miscellaneous Retail 88
Industry Code
(NAICS2007)
114 Fishing, Hunting and Trapping 39
115 Support Activities for Agriculture and Forestry 5
237 Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction 6
311 Food Manufacturing 58
313 Textile Mills 18
continued
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321 Wood Product Manufacturing 4
322 Paper Manufacturing 60
323 Printing and Related Support Activities 6
325 Chemical Manufacturing 313
326 Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing 33
327 Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing 83
331 Primary Metal Manufacturing 774
332 Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing 58
333 Machinery Manufacturing 18
334 Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 14
335 Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing 12
336 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 5
337 Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing 24
339 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 6
423 Merchant Wholesalers, Durable Goods 10
Total 3,983
The table reports the list of products that have been under AD investigation over the sample period.
Figures in the right hand side of the table indicate the number of commissioners’ votes.0.5
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